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We’re in the Money:  
CEO Overconfidence and the Effects Of M&A Announcement Communication  
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the moderating effect of conveyed confidence on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and acquirer stock returns. Drawing on signaling theory as our 
theoretical lens, we argue that CEO overconfidence influences deal performance. Relying on 
the behavioral literature on CEO overconfidence we hypothesize that acquisitions helmed by 
overconfident acquirer CEOs yield negative acquirer stock returns upon announcement and 
that the level of conveyed confidence can dampen this effect. Based on original data that 
incorporates the financial data of the firms, their stock performance, and collect press releases 
for the focal deals, we test our hypothesis using a sample of mergers and acquisitions of 
public targets conducted by constituents of the S&P 500 from 2014 until 2020. Contrary to 
our baseline hypothesis, we do not find a negative relationship between CEO overconfidence 
and the acquirer stock returns. However, lower levels of conveyed confidence in the acquirer 
announcement communication lead to a significantly more positive stock return for 
overconfident acquirer CEOs. Our findings advance the literature on M&A announcements by 
looking into the level of conveyed confidence that is disseminated through the M&A 
announcement press releases as we address how individual factors and M&A communication 
work together to influence investors.  
Keywords: Acquisitions; CEO overconfidence; Signaling Theory;  Event Study; 
1. Introduction  
We're confident that, once regulators see the compelling benefits, they'll agree this is the right 
move at the right time for consumers and the country. April 29, 2018, joint press release for 





CEOs helming the next acquisition are commonly expected to convey confidence in 
the outcome of their recent strategic decision to pair up with others for the future. Empirically, 
however, many acquisitions progress as failures (McCarthy & Aalbers, 2016; Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005), with acquisitions driving negative or neutral effect on the 
performance of the acquiring firm (Graebner, Eisenhardt, & Roundy, 2010; Heimeriks, 
Schijven, & Gates, 2012; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Overconfidence refers to a 
cognitive bias of substantial scholarly interest (Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015; Lee, Hwang, 
& Chen, 2017) and a widely observed phenomenon in human decision-making and M&A 
research at large (Lee et al., 2017; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). CEOs, as frequent decision-
makers, are often prone to this bias (Heaton, 2002; Navis & Ozbek, 2016) and research on the 
influence of CEO overconfidence on firm performance outcomes has yielded mixed results 
(Chen et al., 2015; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Navis & Ozbek, 
2016). However, in the context of mergers and acquisitions (hereafter: M&A), the acquirer 
CEO’s level of overconfidence is associated with negative short-term stock market reactions 
upon M&A announcement (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). On the other hand, deal-specific 
confidence, meaning the confidence of a CEO to generate value with a specific deal, 
represents a positive signal to investors (Gamache et al., 2018; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Hence, 
the question arises how investors react to combinations of signals of CEO overconfidence and 
deal-specific confidence? Therefore, we investigated the moderating effect of conveyed 
confidence in the M&A announcement communication on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and acquirer announcement stock returns.  
We draw on a behavioral conceptualization of investors and regard stock market 
reactions as an indicator for the overall investor sentiment triggered by the release of new 




theory and impression management offer powerful theoretical lenses to study the effects of 
disseminated information on investors’ reactions to M&A announcements (Campbell et al., 
2016; Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2016). In this paper, we draw on signaling theory and 
follow Vergne, Wernicke, and Brenner (2018: 811) who argue that “it may be more realistic 
to examine the drivers of signal credibility [hence, the relationship between signal and 
underlying quality (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011)] from the viewpoint of signal 
interpreters”. This is especially interesting since scholars have begun assessing the effect of 
signal interaction, and in particular signal incongruence (Paruchuri, Han, & Prakash, 2020; 
Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014). While the aforementioned papers show the overall negative 
effects of signal incongruence, we set out to investigate a case in which signal incongruence 
might yield positive outcomes. While acquirer CEO overconfidence represents a negative 
signal to investors in M&A announcements, because of its increased likelihood to destroy 
value (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986), deal-specific conveyed confidence represents a 
positive signal, indicating value creation (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Our results indicate that 
lower levels of conveyed confidence are more positive in the case of higher levels of CEO 
overconfidence, showing that signal incongruence can yield positive effects for the acquirer 
announcement stock returns.  
Following previous literature, we define CEO overconfidence as an acquired cognitive 
bias that fosters a CEO’s belief to possess superior capabilities in deriving value from M&A 
deals. One key aspect of CEO overconfidence is its nature as a cognitive bias rather than an 
inter-individual disposition. Hence, overconfidence is acquired by a CEO rather than a 
manifestation of his or her personality (Billett & Qian, 2008). Therefore, the recent 
experience of a CEO is likely to influence the level of overconfidence he or she possesses, 
which in turn influences the decision-making process (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 




management and finance to assess the level of conveyed confidence in documents (Lee et al., 
2017; Loughran & McDonald, 2011). We analyzed the acquirer M&A announcement press 
releases to conduct this measure since press releases represent a medium that is widely 
followed by investors (Dyck & Zingales, 2003).  
 Our contributions to the literature are threefold. Firstly, indicators of the level of CEO 
confidence in the value-creating potential of an M&A event were found to influence 
investors’ reactions upon M&A announcement (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Schijven & Hitt, 
2012). However, there is an ongoing debate to further shed light on the conditions influencing 
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm performance outcomes (Reyes, 
Vassolo, Kausel, Torres, & Zhang, 2020). We add to this by investigating how the conveyed 
confidence in the M&A announcement communication influences the aforementioned 
relationship, thereby, extending the literature on signal interaction and signal incongruence in 
particular.  Secondly, research on M&A announcement effects has started to look into the 
influence of acquirer communication prior to and around M&A announcements. For instance, 
Graffin, Haleblian, and Kiley (2016) found that acquirers are more likely to disclose a higher 
frequency of positive yet deal-unrelated press releases prior to an M&A announcement that is 
anticipated to yield negative investor response. However, this research has not yet looked into 
the effects of the M&A announcement communication itself (Gao, Yu, & Cannella Jr, 2016). 
We aim to advance the literature here by looking into the level of conveyed confidence that is 
disseminated through the M&A announcement press releases. Thirdly, research drawing on 
behavioral theory has found various links between individual-level factors and M&A 
outcomes (Devers et al., 2020; Welch, Pavićević, Keil, & Laamanen, 2019). However, the 
M&A communication strategy has paid less attention to how individual factors and M&A 





The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, the literature on CEO 
overconfidence and its influence on investors is summarized to build our baseline hypothesis. 
Secondly, the influence of M&A communication is laid out and our second hypothesis is 
formulated on how communication can influence the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and investor reactions. Thirdly, the data, the analysis, and the results are 
presented according to the hypotheses. Finally, a discussion of the results is provided and the 
paper closes with managerial implications and recommendations for future research.   
2 Theory and hypotheses  
2.1 CEO overconfidence and its influence on M&A short-term stock market responses   
Overconfidence represents a cognitive bias referring to a mismatch between perceived 
and reasonable levels of confidence (Moore & Healy, 2008). It leads individuals to have an 
unrealistic belief in their performance and predictions. Here, we look into the influence of 
CEO overconfidence, defined as an acquired cognitive bias that fosters a CEO’s belief to 
possess superior capabilities in deriving value from M&A deals (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Roll, 1986).  
CEO overconfidence is conceptually distinct from CEO narcissism. Firstly, because 
CEO narcissism represents a personality dimension that is timely more stable than CEO 
overconfidence (Brunzel, 2020). Secondly, because CEO overconfidence does not entail a 
need for adulation and a lack of empathy, which both represent core diagnostics for CEO 
narcissism (Cragun, Olsen, & Wright, 2019). CEOs are due to their position of power more 
like to experience overconfidence (Fast et al., 2012). While a recent meta-study found an 
overall positive influence of CEO overconfidence on firm performance measures (Burkhard, 
Siren, Van Essen, & Grichnik, 2018) this relationship is likely to vary in different contexts 
(Reyes, Vassolo, Kausel, Torres, & Zhang, 2020). Especially in the context of M&A, CEO 




(Malmendier & Tate, 2008). This relationship could be triggered by the tendency of 
overconfident CEOs to engage in less comprehensive and higher-stake strategic actions 
(Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). 
Following, this line of research we expect to also find a negative relationship between 
higher levels of CEO overconfidence and investors’ reaction to M&A announcements.  
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of CEO overconfidence is associated with lower levels of short-
term acquirer stock returns upon M&A announcement.  
2.2 The conveyed confidence in firm disclosures – the influence of textual tone  
Impression management tactics by firms aimed at influencing the market’s perceptions 
of M&A announcements have gained track in recent years, showing that firms alter their 
communication practices in expectation of negative investor response to acquisition 
announcements (Gamache et al., 2018; Graffin et al., 2016). While traditional signaling theory 
regards language-based signals as unreliable because senders face equal costs producing them 
(Bergh, Connelly, Ketchen Jr, & Shannon, 2014), this assumption is based on isolated 
substantive signals (Connelly et al., 2011). However, if analyzing multiple signals and their 
interactions, language has been found to influence the uptake of substantive signals (i.e. 
signals with a separating cost function) (Steigenberger & Wilhelm, 2018). By drawing on 
Vergne et al. (2018) we argue that the effectiveness of a signal is grounded in the 
interpretation of the signal by the signal receiver, taking the stance, that both substantive 
signals and impression management tactics, can represent powerful market signals. One key 
aspect of language that was found to influence investors is the textual tone (Hossain, 
Raghunandan, & Rama, 2020; Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2014; Price, Doran, Peterson, & Bliss, 
2012). For instance, the textual tone of earnings announcements press releases positively 
influences the stock market response at publication time (Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 2012). In 




of confidence (Lee et al., 2017). In the M&A literature, to the best of our knowledge the tone 
of M&A announcements has not yet been analyzed (Gao, Yu, & Cannella Jr, 2016). Since the 
M&A announcement represents the point at which the public is initially informed about the 
intention of the acquirer to purchase another company (Welch, Pavićević, Keil, & Laamanen, 
2019), the conveyed of the M&A communication could potentially influence the evaluation of 
the deal by the investors. Thereby, the level of conveyed confidence could influence the more 
substantive signal of CEO overconfidence by mitigating its negative effects. 
Hypothesis 2: Lower levels of conveyed confidence in a firm’s M&A announcement 
communication positively moderate the relationship between CEO overconfidence and short-
term acquirer stock returns upon M&A announcement. 
3 Methods  
3.1 Sample 
The opportunity to establish the empirical value of the above arguments is tested using 
Thomson SDC to build our acquisition sample. The initial population encompasses all M&As 
of public targets undertook by constituents of the S&P 500 as of December 31, 2020. We 
refine this to include all M&As announced: (1) between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 
2020; (2) which do not involve a recapitalization, repurchase of own shares, or a spin-off to 
existing shareholders; (3) in which the acquirer was seeking to buy 100% of the target shares 
at the announcement. This selection leaves us with a sample size of n = 158 deals, for which 
we calculated our variables. Our dataset is composed using different data sources. In addition, 
we used LexisNexis to collect acquirer press releases for the focal deals.  
3.2 Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we estimated four robust ordinary least square (OLS) models. 
In all cases, we control for unobserved effects by including year dummies, and we correct for 





Acquirer abnormal short-term stock market returns. We operationalized the investors’ 
reaction using the conventional event study measure of short-term cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). Event studies using CARs are very common in acquisition research (Haleblian, 
Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). They represent a good measure for gauging 
the overall market sentiment change as a consequence of the dissemination of new information 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). While the event study methodology has initially been developed 
to test hypotheses that are based on the efficient market hypothesis, recent publications are 
relaxing these assumptions, showing that it can also be applied to semi-strong assumptions 
(Schijven & Hitt, 2012). In this paper, the CARs are calculated using a ten-day trading window, 
previously used in CEO overconfidence studies (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Moreover, for 
subsequent robustness checks, we calculated the CARs for three, five, and seven days. The 
event windows are centered around the official acquisition announcement date to allow 
capturing trading that happened due to information leakage (Ahern & Sosyura, 2014).   
Independent Variables  
Level of CEO overconfidence. Following the literature on CEO overconfidence, we 
measured the level of CEO overconfidence, as the stock appreciation during the twelve-month 
prior to an M&A announcement, excluding the period in which we gathered our dependent 
variable (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Level of conveyed confidence. We built our measures 
of conveyed confidence based on the textual tone of firm communication in the acquisition 
announcement. More specifically, we analyzed the content of press releases using an automated 
linguistic approach that exploits dictionaries particularly developed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) for the analysis of financial text bodies. Firstly, we counted the number of 
negative words in a given document and standardized it by the total number of words in a 




text bodies (e.g. Twitter account,  earnings conference calls transcripts) (Lee et al., 2017). 
Secondly, we conducted a measure to be used in the robustness check. Following Huang et al. 
(2014) we calculated the textual tone of a document taking the difference between negative and 
positive words, and dividing it by the total number of words in a document (Hossain et al., 
2020).  
Control variables  
Method of payment. The payment method is computed as a three-point ordinal scale: 1 for cash 
only, 2 for any combination of cash and stock, and 3 for stock only (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997).  
Acquisition premiums. The acquisition premium is computed as the percentage difference 
between the actual price paid per target share by the acquirer and the target’s share price one 
week prior to the announcement of the acquisition. 
Acquisition experience. We calculated the acquisition experience of a firm by cumulating all 
completed acquisitions that were undertaken by the acquirer from 1990 until the focal deal.  
Geographic proximity. The measure for geographic proximity was created using a three-point 
ordinal scale that indicated 2 if both the acquirer and the target were located in the same US 
state, 1 if the acquirer and the target were headquartered in the same count, and 0 otherwise.  
Industry proximity. The measure for industry proximity is based on the overlap between the 
acquirer the target primary SIC. Therefore, the first three digits of the SIC were compared. If 
all three overlapped the industry similarity was ranked as two, if only two overlapped 
Acquirer performance. We measure acquirer performance as the Return on Assets in the last 12 
months before the acquisition announcements.  
Defense tactics. This variable indicates whether the target had deployed any defense tactics (i.e. 




Acquirer debt-to-equity. This variable represents the capital structure of the acquirer 




To test our hypotheses, we estimated several robust ordinary least square (OLS) 
models.  Table 1 provides the descriptives for the variables of this research. Table 2 shows the 
outcome of these regressions. Before interpreting the results, we check the base specification 
for multi-collinearity. With variance inflation factor (VIF) test reveals that the highest VIF for 
a single variable is 3.21, with a mean of 1.47, these values are well below the established cut-
offs of 5 and 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992). Multi-collinearity thus is not a 
concern.  
Insert table 1 about here 
 
Table 2, model 1 reports the regression outcome based on our base set of controls. Model 2 
adds the recent stock performance as an indicator of the level of  CEO overconfidence. The 
influence of the level of CEO overconfidence has a positive influence on the acquirer stock 
returns (β Model 2 = 0.047, p < .001), which does not support our Hypothesis 1 in which we 
formulated a negative relationship between the level of CEO overconfidence and the acquirer 
stock returns. Model 3 adds the ratio of negative words in the M&A announcement press 
release as an indicator for the Level of conveyed confidence. This model is used as the 
baseline to compare to model 4, in which the interaction term between Level of conveyed 
confidence CEO overconfidence is inserted, regressing on short-term acquirer stock returns 
upon M&A announcement. The results of Model 3 suggest that controlling for market 
sentiment, overconfidence has a positive influence on the acquirer stock return and the 




the acquirer stock returns (β Model 3 = -195.741, p < .001). Meaning that lower levels of 
conveyed confidence in the M&A announcement communication positively influence the 
stock returns.  
Insert table 2 about here 
 
The interaction model shows a significant positive effect of the interaction term between CEO 
overconfidence and the level of conveyed confidence (β Model 4 = -12.723,  p < .001). This 
supports hypothesis 2: lower levels of conveyed confidence are associated with higher  
acquirer stock market returns. The effect can be observed in the interaction plot in Figure 1.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Additional analysis 
While outside the scope of our research, we also ran a model comparison between 
Model 2 and Model 3, to investigate whether adding the text-based variable for Conveyed 
confidence leads to a significant increase in variance explained. The test reveals that the 
difference of explained variance between Model 2 and Model 3 (Adjusted R² difference = 
0.023) is significant (F(1,131) = 4.44, p < 0.05). Hence, the results indicate the Conveyed 
confidence explains variance in the acquirer stock return.  
Robustness check  
We used several additional measures to test the robustness of our models. Firstly, we 
applied a different measure for Conveyed confidence. While the initial analysis contained the 
original measures adopted from Lee et al. (2017) (i.e. the ratio of negative words to the total 
count of words in a document), we included a measure for the textual tone that is widely used 
in the finance literature to capture the level of Conveyed confidence in the M&A 




yielded similar results and hence support our findings previously laid out. Secondly, we 
altered the event size for our dependent variable and captured the CARs of three- (-1,1), five- 
(-2,2), and seven- (-3,3) days. The event studies conducted applying these altered time periods 
return comparable results to the larger and more commonly used in CEO overconfidence 
measurement in research.  
4. Discussion  
The literature on the short term performance of mergers and acquisitions ignores the 
impact of CEO overconfidence, as deals are announced to the market. The benefits of a 
confident CEO, we pose − in terms of the acquirer’s abnormal short-term stock market 
returns. However, maybe prone to behavioral bias. Extending on recent calls in the M&A 
literature to explore behavioral effects in relation to post M&A outcomes (e.g., Devers et al., 
2020; de Groote et al., 2019; Schijven and Hitt, 2012), our findings suggest CEO 
overconfidence to matter, yet perhaps in an unexpected, and less direct, manner relative to 
recent insight on how behavior is conveyed to the market (e.g. de Groote et al. 2019). Our 
findings suggest that lower levels of conveyed confidence in the acquirer announcement 
communication lead to a significantly more positive stock return for overconfident acquirer 
CEOs. Our findings the level of conveyed confidence to matter, when taking the textual tone 
of firm communication in the acquisition announcement into account. Conveyed confidence 
based on the textual tone of firm communication, originally analyzed by scraping the content 
of press releases using an original automated linguistic approach, we address how individual 
factors and M&A communication work together to influence investors.  
In this study, specifically, we showed how the conveyed confidence of M&A 
communication influences the market reactions to the acquisition announcements depending 
on the level of CEO overconfidence. The data did not fully support our baseline hypothesis of  




acquirer stock. Still, our results offer contributions to the signaling theory literature, by 
looking into the interaction effect of two signals: the level of CEO overconfidence and the 
level of conveyed confidence in the M&A announcement communication. While deal-specific 
signals of managerial confidence are associated with positive acquirer stock returns (Schijven 
& Hitt, 2012), CEO-specific signals of high confidence are associated with negative acquirer 
stock returns (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Our paper shows that 
these signals interact to yield different levels of investor reactions to M&A announcements.  
Conclusions 
Our results indicate that the influence of CEO overconfidence on the acquirer stock 
returns is moderated by the level of conveyed confidence in the M&A announcement 
communication. Hence, these two signals interact to influence investors. Moreover, lower 
levels of conveyed confidence (a positive signal of CEO deal-specific confidence) are more 
beneficial in the case of higher levels of CEO overconfidence. Therefore, we find interesting 
results of how signal incongruence can yield positive effects. Moreover, while outside of the 
scope of our study, we find that conveyed confidence is explaining a substantive part of the 
acquirer stock returns, which is showing initial evidence for the effectiveness of language-
based signals in M&A announcements (Steigenberger & Wilhelm, 2018).  
Managerial implications 
M&A are risky endeavors for companies and negative acquirer stock returns can 
jeopardize the chance of M&A completion. Hence, steering against a negative market 
perception can prove beneficial for CEOs and the M&As they are about to helm. Especially, 
in case the past indicates that firm executives might fall prone to overconfidence bias. The 
main finding, that lower levels of conveyed confidence are yielding higher acquirer stock 
returns in case antecedents of CEO overconfidence are present, informs firms about how to 




a positive signal to the market, the recent performance of a company can make investors 
particularly suspicious of a higher level of conveyed confidence. Hence, CEOs and their firms 
should consider these factors when engaging in investor communication.  
Limitations and future research direction. 
As with any study ours also is not without limitations. Several limitations are worth 
discussing to put our results in perspective and to layout promising paths for future research. 
Firstly, we were not able to replicate previous findings that reported a negative stock market 
effects of CEO overconfidence on acquirer stock returns (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). 
However, a key limitation compared to previous studies on CEO overconfidence is that we 
built our measure on only one component. While the past stock performance has been found 
to contribute to CEO overconfidence, future research should consider other measures. One 
particularly promising area is to draw on psychology research and not only consider factors 
contributing to a general CEO overconfidence but to develop different measures that capture 
domain-specific CEO overconfidence. Bandura, Freeman, and Lightsey (1999) laid out that 
the belief in one’s capacities can vary strongly between activities. Hence, CEO levels of 
overconfidence might differ for various domains leading to different behavior and outcomes 
for various corporate activities. Secondly, while press releases represent the major form of 
M&A announcement communication because their release marks the timing of the 
announcement, acquirers also draw on other communication channels to disseminate 
information about M&A events to investors. For instance, the adoption of conference calls as 
an additional means of communication has increased over the last years. While research has 
found that the usage of conference calls can have positive effects on the acquirer stock returns 
by supplying incremental information to investors (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011), research has 
not yet analyzed the influence of the level of conveyed confidence in these calls in M&A 




further investigate the role of signal incongruence. While we provide insights into how signal 
incongruence can yield positive reactions, an analysis across communication channels in the 
M&A announcement could further shed light on signal interaction. In particular, because 
audiences of different channels might react differently to the same signals (DesJardine, Marti, 
& Durand, 2020) and firms might hence adopt communication according to audience 
expectations, especially the linguistic content (König, Mammen, Luger, Fehn, & Enders, 
2018).  
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Table 2. Multiple regression (dummies for year and industry not reported). Dependent variable: acquirer's cumulative 
abnormal returns 
 DV: acquirer's cumulative abnormal return (-5,5) 
 H1 H2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Acquisition premium (1 Week prior) -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Acquirer performance 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Acquirer debt-to-equity -0.099 -0.053 -0.109 -0.094 
 (0.236) (0.226) (0.224) (0.207) 
Geographic proximity -0.823 -0.790 -0.823 -0.900 
 (0.681) (0.650) (0.642) (0.592) 
Number of competing bidders -0.038 0.055 0.513 0.601 
 (1.263) (1.205) (1.210) (1.115) 
Industry similarity -0.034 0.101 0.056 -0.030 
 (0.436) (0.418) (0.413) (0.381) 
Merger of equals -1.930 -2.683 -2.542 -1.665 
 (3.357) (3.210) (3.170) (2.927) 
Defense tactics 0.092 0.228 -0.207 -0.497 
 (4.641) (4.428) (4.377) (4.034) 
 (1.376) (1.317) (1.313) (1.211) 
CEO overconfidence  0.047*** 0.048*** 0.022* 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Conveyed confidence   -195.741** -207.600** 
   (92.848) (85.606) 
CEO overconfidence* Conveyed confidence    -12.723*** 
    (2.585) 
Constant 0.875 1.657 2.333 2.035 
 (1.602) (1.543) (1.557) (1.436) 
 
Observations 158 158 158 158 
R2 0.130 0.214 0.239 0.359 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.089 0.112 0.245 
Residual Std. Error 4.268 (df = 133) 4.072 (df = 132) 4.020 (df = 131) 3.705 (df = 130) 
F Statistic 0.992 (df = 20; 133) 1.707** (df = 21; 132) 1.874** (df = 22; 131) 3.164*** (df = 23; 130) 
 
Note: 














Figure 1. Estimated interaction effect 
